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Inter Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a
Surviving Spouse
By ROBERT C.

BENSIG*

In other than community property states, legislation has been
enacted in a majority of jurisdictions which gives to a surviving
spouse the power to elect whether to accept any benefits conferred by a deceased spouse's will, or to renounce the will entirely
and take a statutory share of the decedent's estate.1 Consequently,
to the extent of this statutory share, the surviving spouse is given
an interest in the estate of the deceased spouse which cannot be
defeated by will.
However, except in jurisdictions which give a spouse an
inchoate interest in any realty of which the consort was seised
as an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, 2 a
spouse is generally not protected by any express statutory pro3
vision against disinheritance by a gratuitous inter vivos transfer.
The election statutes do not expressly protect the survivor, because they provide for a designated share in the "estate" of the
decedent, which includes only property which the decedent
owned at the time of death.
Therefore, in regard to transfers of personalty, and also realty
in states which have abolished inchoate interests, the question
arises as to whether one may use the device of gratuitous inter
vivos transfer to disinherit his spouse when the election statutes
prevent him from doing so by will.
* A.B., LL.B., University of Louisville; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University; member
of the Kentucky Bar; Associate Professor of Law, Western Reserve University.
'For the share given a survivor in the various states, see IU Vmumanm,
A mucN FAmLy LAws sees. 189, 216 (1935).
- A large number of states no longer give a spouse an inchoate interest in
realty of which the other was seised at any time during coverture, but in lieu
thereof give the survivor a designated share in property owned by the decedent
at the time of death. See II VERNIER, AmcAN F.ALy LAws secs. 189, 216
(1935).
No jurisdiction gives a spouse an inchoate interest in personalty which the

other owned at any time during coverture.
'See, however: TENN. CODE sees. 8365, 8366 (Williams, 1934), (Inter vivos
transfer made with intent to defeat spouse's statutory share voidable.); PA. STAT.
A~x.tit. 20, sec. 301.11 (Purdon, 1950) (Conveyance of assets by person who retains a power of appointment by will, power of revocation, or consumption of
principal, is testamentary so far as surviving spouse is concerned.)
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The present discussion is primarily concerned with inter vivos
transfers of property in trust because the problems presented by

this method are more complex and occur more frequently than
in other type transfers. On the whole, however, what is ap-

plicable to transfers in trust will also apply to other transfers,
for the theories and policies involved are substantially the same.4
I

Majority Rule

In a majority of jurisdictions, the test of the validity of an
inter vivos transfer when attacked by a surviving spouse is
whether the transferor in good faith divested himself of the
ownership of the property transferred. 5 The good faith required
does not refer to the transferor's intent or purpose to deprive his
spouse of property which would otherwise pass to the latter because of the election statutes, but to the intent of the transferor
to divest himself of the ownership of the property.6 Therefore,

when the courts in applying this test speak of fraud, or fraudulent
intent, they mean only that the spouse did not intend to divest
himself of the ownership of the property involved. The courts
also oftentimes refer to valid transfers as being "real" or "abso-

lute," and invalid transfers as being "colorable," "illusory," or
"testamentary." While these terms are not necessarily inter-

changeable in every sense in which they may be used,7 when
each is used only to designate the fact of the validity or invalidity
of an inter vivos transfer under this test, their meanings are
identical and no further attempt at classification seems necessary.
'The reverse is also, true. Consequently, where broad principles applicable
to the question regaidless of the type transfer actually made are involved, references will sometimes be made to non-trust cases.
'Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
'Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 112 AtI. 62 (1920);
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937). Also see cases collected
in 64 A.L.R. 466 (1929); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); 157 A.L.R. 1185 (1945).
'The term "colorable" may be used to indicate a transfer which is absolute
on its face but which is actually not a transfer at all because of some agreement
between the parties to the effect that the transferor is to retain ownership. See 44
Mic . L. R. 151, 153 (1945).
"Illusory" may be used to indicate a transfer which on its face shows that
the transferor has not divested himself of control. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y.
371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58
N.E. 2d 381 (1944).
"Testamentary" technically always indicates a disposition of property which
is not intended to vest an interest in the donee until the death of the donor. See
BLACk's LAw DICTIoNAny (4th ed. 1951). For a different use-of the term, however, see Scorr, Tnus'rs sees. 57.5, p. 350 (1939).
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Relationship of The Statute of Wills and General Property Law
When will a transferor be deemed to have divested himself
of ownership so as to preclude his surviving spouse from setting
the transfer aside? If he retains so much control over the property that the transfer is invalid under the Statute of Wills, 8 the
transfer is void and will everywhere be set aside in its entirety.9
It will be set aside not only at the suit of the survivor, but at that
of the executor or any other party who will benefit if the property
is a part of the transferor's estate. 10
In applying the Statute of Wills to trusts, the courts have been
extremely liberal, and permit the settlor to retain a great many
of the perogatives of ownership without requiring that the transaction be executed as a will. It is well settled that a donor may
retain a life interest, or the power to revoke or modify the trust
in whole or in part, or all of these, and that such reservations do
not, in themselves, make the trust testamentary." Where, however, in addition to both the retention of a life interest and the
power to revoke and modify the trust, 2 the settlor also retains
such power to control the trustee as to the details of the administration of the trust that the trustee is in substance nothing more
than the agent of the settlor,:" the disposition insofar as it is intended to take effect after the settlor's death is invalid unless the
requirements of the Wills Act are complied with. 4
'A disposition not intended to go into effect until the death of the donor is
void unless executed in accordance with the statutes regulating the making of
wills. See BRowN, PERSONAL PRoPERTY sec. 48 (1936); Scott, TRUSTS sees. 56,
56.1 et seq., 57.2 (1939); I BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES sees. 103, 104 (1935).
Also see RESTATE. mNT, TRUSTS sees. 56.57 (1935).
' In a transfer not involving a trust, title in such instances does not pass from
the donor, and the property therefore remains a part of the donor's estate. See
BRowN, PERsONAL PRoPERTY see. 48 (1936).
In a transfer in trust, even though the donor vests title to the property in the
trustee, the transaction is nevertheless invalid since no interest passes to the beneficiaries prior to the donor's death. See ScoTT, TRUSTS see. 57.2 (1939).
" Providing, of course, that such party is permitted by local procedure to
bring suit.
' See ScoTT, TRUSTS sec. 57.1 (1939); RESTATEmT, TRUSTS see. 57 (1935).
"Unless the settlor has retained power to effect a revocation of the trust,
reservation of the power to control the trustee in the administration of the trust
is immaterial. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 73 L. Ed. 410,
49 S. Ct. Rep. 123, 66 A.L.R. 397 (1929).
"REsTATEmNT,

TRUSTs sec. 57, subd. (2)

(1935).

Warsco v. Oshkosh

Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924); Newman v. Dore, 275
N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937); also see statements to this effect in: Pres. &
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. 2d 113 (1944);
Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 227, 164 A.L.R. 877 (1946).
" The precise line of demarcation between control that will be deemed to
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Similarly, when the settlor declares himself to be trustee of the
property and reserves not only a life interest but also a power to
revoke and modify the trust, the trust is not testamentary merely
because of the reservation of these powers."5 As in the case of a
transfer to another as trustee, however, if in addition to the above
powers the settlor reserves the power to deal with the property as
he wishes for as long as he lives, the intended trust is invalid
unless executed in conformity with the Statute of Wills. 6
The only instance in which the courts have really ignored
this last qualification, and the furthest that they have gone in
holding a transaction not to be in violation of the Statute of Wills,
is where one deposits money in a savings account in his name as
trustee for another. In this situation, in the absence of any evidence of the depositor's intention other than the form of the
deposit, some courts follow the doctrine laid down in the New
York case of Matter of Totten,17 and indulge in the presumption
that the depositor intended to create a trust and to reserve a
power not only to revoke the trust but to deal with the deposit
during his lifetime in any way he should desire.' 8 This presumprender the trustee the agent of the settlor and that which will not is not clearly
defined by the courts. Space and the limitation of the scope of this article prevent
an exhaustive consideration of this difficult problem. For a detailed treatment,
see: ScoT, TRusTs see. 57.2 (1939); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES sees. 103 et
seq. (1935).
Also see: 38 YALE L. Joum. 1135 (1929), 25 ILL. L. REv. 178 (1930), 28
MxCH. L. REv. 603 (1930), 78 U. of PA. L. BEv. 626 (1930), 5 Wis. L. REv. 321
(1930), 19 MINN. L. REv. 821 (1935).
'"Dickersos Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 AUt. 64 (1887); De Leuil's Ex'rs v. De
Leuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S.W. 2d 474 (1934); O'Hara v. O'Hara 291 Mass. 75,
195 N.E. 909 (1935); Smith v. Deshaw, 116 Vt. 441, 78 A. 2d 479 (1951). Also
see ScoTT, TRUSTS sec. 57.6 (1939); RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS see. 57 (1935).
" Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (1908); Tunnell's Estate,
325 Pa. 554, 190 AUt. 906 (1937). Also see ScoTT, TRusTs sec. 57.6 (1939); RESTATEMfENT, TRUSTS see. 57 subd. (3) (1935).
" 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). ("A deposit by one person of his own
money, in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish
an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or
notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death
of the depositor.")
"See Scorr, TRUSTS sees. 58.1, 58.2, 58.3 (1939), and the cases collected
therein. Also see ATmNSON, Wn~xs 173-177 (2d ed. 1953). This is the position
adopted in the RESTATEMNT OF TRUSTS, sec. 58. In some states, however, the
fact that the depositor intends to reserve control over the deposit is held to render
the transaction testamentary. See ScoTT, TRUSTS see. 58.3, where these cases are
collected.
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tion is, of course, rebuttable. Therefore, if it is shown that the
depositor intended to vest an interest in the beneficiary only
upon the depositor's death, the deposit is testamentary and invalid under the Statute of Wills. Also it may be possible to show
that the depositor did not intend to create a trust at all, but
rather to use the account as a "dummy" for some special purpose
of his own.'" In the latter instance, the Statute of Wills is not
involved; no trust arises simply because none was intended.
The Basis of The Surviving Spouse's Rights
Since a surviving spouse is not defeated by a "dummy" transaction, or by one which is invalid under the Statute of Wills, the
next question that arisc, is whether a disposition which is valid
under the Statute of Wills and is not a "dummy" is safe from attack by a surviving spouse? That is, is the test insofar as the
rights of a survivor are concerned simply whether the disposition
is valid or invalid under the Statute of Wills and general property
law?
(a) The Statute of Wills and General Property Law
One line of cases clearly appears to answer this question in
the affirmative.2" Typical of these is Kerwin v. Donaghy,21 in
which the court stated:
"Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 AtI. 807 (1908) (made for depositor's
personal convenience); Morris v. Sheehan, 234 N.Y. 366, 138 N.E 23 (1922)
(personal convenience); Robertson v. Parker, 287 Mass. 351, 191 N.E. 645 (1934)
(bank limited size of account; deposit made to collect interest thereon.); In re
Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951) (dictum).
For a discussion of various reasons why depositors may make such deposits,
see Scorr, TRusTs sec. 58.1 (1939); BocERT, TnusTs 47 (Hornbook Series, 3d
ed. 1952); 8 TENPLE L. Q. 87 (1933).
'Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269, 28 So. 940 (1900); Brown v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915); Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank,
152 Md. 654, 137 AUt. 378 (1927); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust
Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 At. 721 (1932); McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A. 2d
447 (1951); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E. 2d 299 (1945);
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E. 2d 337
(1950). And see the dissenting opinions in Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437,
72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947).
Also see the following savings account cases: In Matter of Clark, 149 Misc.
374, 268 N.Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of McCann, 155 Misc. 763, 281
N.Y. Supp. 445 (Surf. Ct. 1935); In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N.Y.
Supp. 28 (Sur. Ct. 1935) aff'd memo. 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. Supp. 818
(1st Dep't 1936); In re Halper's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951)
(Technically dictum, but important because it changes the prior New York law.).
The Halpern rule has been adopted in the following Savings account cases; In re
Freistadt's Will, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't 1951); In re
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The limitation... upon the right of a husband to
disinherit his wife by a conveyance or gift of personal property inter vivos, that the conveyance or gift must not be
"colorable" . . . means merely that the conveyance or gift
must be one legally binding on the settlor or donor, accom22
plished in his lifetime, and not testamentary in its effect.
The nature of the survivor's rights in these cases, therefore, is
merely the same as that of any other person entitled to a share
of the decedent's estate. 3
(b) The Election Statutes
Another line of cases, however, following the decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York as stated in Newman v. Dore, 4
answers the question in the negative. 5 In Newman v. Dore, the
court declared:
Naydan's Estate, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 701 (Surf. Ct. 1951); In re Ward's Estate, 279
App. Div. 616, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 817 (2d Dep't 1951); In re Prokaskey's Will, 109
N.Y.S. 2d 888 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Aybor's Estate, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 720 (Sur.
Ct. 1952); In re Phipps' Will, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (Sur. Ct. 1953).

This is the Restatement's position in ordinary trust cases. See

RESTATEzMENT,

TnusTs sec. 57, comment c. (1935). In savings account cases, however, the
position is taken that the survivor can reach the deposit. RESTATEMNT, TRusTs
sec. 58, comment cc. (1948 Supp.).
In Indiana it is provided by statute that: "In determining the net estate of a
deceased spouse for the purpose of computing the amount due the surviving
spouse electing to take against the will, the court shall consider only such property as would have passed under the laws of descent and distribution." 3 INDIANA
STATUTES ANN. (Bums, 1953 Replacement) sec. 301.
1317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E. 2d 299 (1945).
'21d. at 556, 59 N.E. 2d at 306.
' See Kerevin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E. 2d 299 (1945), where the
court stated that the right of a wife was no higher than the similar right of a child
of the decedent.
"275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14
N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div.
234, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941); afrnning 176 Misc. 312, 27 N.Y.S. 2d
270 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Bums v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 448
(2d Dept 1943), reversing mem., 37 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd on
reargument, 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), aff'd without
opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E. 2d 785 (1945); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322
Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195,
58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944); Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947).
Also see the following savings account cases; Murray v. Brooklyn Savings
Bank, 169 Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1939); rev'd on other grounds,
258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939); Krause v. Krause, 285
N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. 2d 779 (1941) [See, however, the interpretation given this
decision by the court in In re Halperns Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120
(1951)1; Application of Barasch, 267 App. Div. 830, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 791 (2d Dep't
1944); Debold v. Kinscher, 268 App. Div. 786, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 900 (2d Dept 1944);
aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 668, 60 N.E. 2d 758 (1945); Stehmer v. Bowery
Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Getz v. Getz, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 757
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We need not now determine whether such a trust
is, for any purpose, a valid present trust.... We do not
now consider .. whether in this case the reserved power
of control is so great that the trustee is in fact "the agent of
the settlor." We assume, without deciding, that except for
the provisions of section
18 of the Decedent Estate Law the
26
trust would be valid.
Even though the court did not decide whether the trust was
testamentary, it did assume that except for the surviving spouse's
rights under the election statute the trust would be valid. Consequently, it would seem that the court recognized that a transaction in which a settlor retains certain measures of control may
be invalid as against a surviving spouse even though the degree
of control retained is not enough to render the transfer invalid
under the Statute of Wills or under general property and trust
law.
An especially clear proof of the application of this theory is
found in the New York savings account cases decided after the
Newman doctrine was announced; for while the New York courts
have consistently held that savings bank deposits of the so-called
"Totten" variety do not violate the Statute of Wills and are otherwise effective trusts upon the death of the depositor, 27 after the
Newman decision and up until 1951,28 these trusts were just as
consistently held to be "illusory," or invalid, as to the surviving
spouse of the depositor.2 9
The clearest example outside of the State of New York of the
recognition of this special right of the survivor is found in two
decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio,30 where the trusts in(Surr. Ct. 1950); Pichurko v. Richardson, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
In re Freistadt's Will, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (Surf. Ct. 1951), aff'd without opinion,
278 App. Div. 962, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 995 (2d Dep't 1951), motion for reargument
granted, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't 1951) [on basis of In
re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951)].
275 N.Y. 371, 380, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 969 (1937). SeQtion 18 of the New
York Decedent Estate Law gives the surviving spouse the right to elect to take
against the will of the deceased spouse.
-'See Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); In re Halpern's
Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951). Also see ScoTT, TRUSTS sec. 58.2
(1939).
'When by dictum the Court of Appeals in In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y.
33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951), rejected the concept that a transaction may be invalid as to a surviving spouse even though it is otherwise valid.
For an excellent comment on the Halpern Case see 37 CoRu. L. Q. 258
(1952).
See savings account cases cited in note 25 supra.
'Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944);
Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947).
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volved, while held invalid as to the surviving spouses and set
aside pro tanto to the extent of the share to which they were entitled by law, were held otherwise valid and effective.
It may seem upon first impression that the concept that a
transaction may be at one and the same time both valid and invalid is a logical impossibfltty. 31 When, however, the basis upon
which this concept rests is understood, it seems quite logical.
That basis is simply a recognition of the fact that the policy
underlying the election statutes is stronger in regard to the degree
of divestment of control necessary for the validity of an inter vivos
transfer than is the policy underlying the Statute of Wills. 2 This
position appears sound, for it is a surviving spouse alone who cannot be deprived by will of a share in the estate of a decedent.38
(1) Control Sufficient to Render a Trust Invalid Under
the Newman v. Dore Concept
Since the Newman v. Dore concept 3 4 creates a different standard of control than the Statute of Wills, the question arises as to
just what degree of reserved control will be sufficient to render
the trust invalid.
Ordinary Trusts: In Newman v. Dore,3 5 the settlor reserved
the income for life, the power to revoke the trust at will, and the
powers granted the trustees were, in general, made "subject to the
settlor's control during his life," and could be exercised "in such
manner only as the settlor shall from time to time direct in writing." The court expressly refused, however, to state whether the
reservation of either the income for life, or the power to revoke
the trust, or both, might, without the power to control the trustee
in the administration of the trust, be sufficient in themselves to
render the trust invalid.3 6
See 23 ConN. L. Q. 457, 458 (1938), where this opinion is expressed.
"See 10 M~nYrLAD L. REv. 1, 8 (1949).
"See ScoTr, TnUSTS sees. 57.5, 58.5 (1939). In sec. 58.5 (1953 Supplement), Professor Scott states: "It might well be held that the policy in favor of
the surviving spouse is stronger than the policy requiring that a testamentary disposition shall be executed with certain formalities; the question is whether the
testator can accomplish a purpose through the creation of such a trust which he
could not accomplish by executing a will."
' That a transfer may be valid as to others, yet invalid as to a surviving
spouse.

"275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
"Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 969 (1937).
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This practice of not laying down precise rules in regard to the
degree of control sufficient to render a trust invalid as to the survivor, but rather to decide each case upon its merits, prevails in
almost every case in which this special concept of the spouse's
rights has been adopted. Consequently, if any general rule exists,
it can be found only by examining the terms of the trusts in which
this issue has arisen.
The results of an examination show that in practically every
instance in which the trust was held invalid, the settlor reserved
not only the income for life, and the power to modify and/or revoke the trust, but in addition expressly reserved some power of
control over the trustee in the administration of the trust.3a While
this summation is admittedly too general to be of any definite
value as a standard by which to judge the validity of a transfer,
because of the reluctance of these courts to lay down precise
rules, no clearer rule can be formulated.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, has shown no such reluctance, and on two occasions has laid down the broad rule
that a trust wherein the settlor reserves the income during his
lifetime together with the right to amend or revoke the trust,
though otherwise valid, is nevertheless invalid as against a surviving spouse. 8
Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943)
(settlor designated as one of two trustees; retained right to appoint and remove
trustees without limitations; retained exclusive control over management of the
trust funds, including right to substitute and replace investments, plus right
to amend or revoke); President & Directors of M. Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290,
14 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (Life income; revocation and modification;
right to withdraw securities and make substitutions in settlor's own discretion;
and, in the words of the Court: ". . . reserved a substantial measure of control
over the management of the trust by the trustee."); Smith v. Northern Trust Co.,
322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944) (Income to settlor for life; right to
alter, amend or revoke; right to veto the sale, disposition or investment of trust
assets by the trustee; in event of illness or changed business conditions, to request of trustee enough of principal to support him in manner to which he is
accustomed.).
But see Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y. S.
2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941), where, while the reserved powers (life income; revocation; alter, amend or modify; withdraw moneys or property therefrom) were substantial, settlor did not expressly retain the right to control the trustee in the
administration of the trust as in the cases cited above.
'In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944),
paragraph 3 of the syllabus states: "The transfer of property to a trustee under an
agreement whereby the settlor reserves to himself the income during his life with
the right to amend or revoke, is valid by virtue of Section 8617, General Code,
but under such a trust agreement settlor does not part absolutely with the dominion of such property and his widow electing to take under the statute of descent
and distribution may assert her right to a distributive share of the property in
such trust at settlor's death."
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No other court has gone as far as the Ohio Supreme Court.
Whether the Ohio Court, or any other, will go even further in
the future and hold invalid a trust in which only the power to
revoke and/or modify is reserved, is a matter for speculation. It
is hoped that they will! If it is conceded to be against the policy
of the election statutes to permit a deceased spouse to retain the
ownership of property for all practical purposes during his lifetime and yet to deprive his spouse of her statutory share, this
result should follow. Where a settlor retains the power to revoke
the trust, or to amend or modify it, either unrestrictedly or to the
extent that he can name himself the sole beneficiary,"9 or where
he reserves the power to withdraw principal therefrom, 40 it is submitted that to the extent of any of these reserved powers his
ownership and control over the property are in ultimate effect
substantially the same as before the transfer in trust. And this
is true even though he does not retain the right to receive the
income from the trust for the remainder of his life.
While the argument has been made 4' that the adoption of a
rule which allows a survivor to reach property placed in a revocable trust will result in a flight of revocable trust capital from
a state adopting the rule into one that does not, as far as is known,
there has been no mass migration of such capital from the State
of Ohio as a result of the decisions in the Bolles and Harriscases.42
In Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 487, 72 N.E. 2d 878 (1947), the complete syllabus in the case reads: "Under the provisions of Section 8617, General
Code, the transfer of property to a trustee is valid under an agreement whereby
the settlor reserves to himself the income during his life with the right to amend
or revoke; but when such settlor does not part with dominion or control over the
trust property, his widow may elect to take under the statute of descent and distribution and may assert her right to a distributive share of such property after
his death (paragraph three of the syllabus in the case of Bolles v. Toledo Trust
Co., Ex'r . . . approved and followed.)"

The syllabus of a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court is written by the court
and states the law of Ohio. It will, however, in case of conflict, be interpreted
with reference to the fact upon which it is predicated and the questions presented to and considered by the court. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Frederick, 142
Ohio St., 605, 58 N.E. 2d 795 (1944); Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128
Ohio St. 124, 190 N.E. 403 (1984).
' And thereby bring about the termination of the trust. See Scorr, TRusTs
sec. 331.2 (1939).
0 Where the settlor has power to draw from the trust estate, he has power to
terminate the trust, Scorr, TRusrs sec. 331.2 (1939).
"This argument was made in a brief filed by the Ohio Fiduciaries Research
Association as amicus curiae in the case of Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72
N.E. 2d 378 (1947).
" Seeo ote 38 supra, for quotations from the syllabi of these cases.
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Savings Account or "Totten" Trusts: No application problem
in regard to the degree of reserved control exists from case to
case in savings account trusts of the so-called "Totten" variety
because the inferred reservation of powers is the same in every
case in which the only evidence of the depositor's intention is the
deposit slip in the standard form of "A in trust for B."
In jurisdictions which adopt the "Totten" trust doctrine, therefore, the only question is that of the standard to be adopted in
judging the validity of these transactions. If the Statute of Wills
is the standard adopted, the survivor will, of course, be completely defeated, since under the "Totten" doctrine these accounts are recognized as valid inter vivos trusts.43 If, however, a
concept is adopted which recognizes that a lesser degree of reserved control than that which is necessary under the Statute of
Wills may invalidate a transfer, the surviving spouse should always prevail, for only in the case of a testamentary transfer is the
reserved power of control as great as it is in a savings account
trust of this type.44
(C) Equities Between the Spouses Considered
In at least two other cases, the courts have considered not
only the degree of control retained by the settlor over the trust
but also whether the surviving spouse was adequately provided
for outside of the trust.4 5
Rights of the Survivor Where Decedent Dies Intestate: Regardless of the standard used to judge the validity of a transfer,
if the transfer is testamentary, or is otherwise completely invalid
because of some rule of general property law, the fact that the
decedent died intestate presents no problem as far as the survivor is concerned. In such case, the property forms a part of
the deceased spouse's estate and the survivor receives the same
'This standard has been applied in the New York cases since the decision in
In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951). See note 20 supra.
" This concept was applied in the New York cases prior to 1951. See note
25 supra.
'See Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A. 2d 465 (1944), which attempts to reconcile the Maryland cases on this ground. For a detailed discussion
of the Maryland cases, see 10 MAnAND L. REv. 1 (1949).
Also see Marine Midland Trust Co. of Binghampton v. Stanford, 256 App.
Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 648 (3rd Dep't 1939), appeal denied, 256 App. Div. 1026,
11 N.Y. S. 2d 547, aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E. 2d 20 (1939).
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interest in it that he would receive in any other instance in which

the decedent died wholly intestate.
If, however, the Newman v. Dore concept is used, since it is
founded upon the policy underlying the election statutes, which,
strictly construed, apply only when there is a will in existence,
the question arises as to whether the survivor may obtain relief
against a non-testamentary transfer when the deceased spouse
dies intestate and there is no will to elect against. According to
the weight of authority an action may be maintained.46 This
seems sound, for a transfer which is otherwise invalid as to the

survivor under this theory would appear to be as much a violation of the policy underlying the election statutes when the

decedent dies intestate as when he dies testate. To deny relief
to the survivor because of the absence of a will would sanction
the violation of this policy on the basis of a technicality, a result
47
which seems indefensible.

Extent to Which Invalid Transfer Set Aside: If a transfer is
invalid as to all persons and for all purposes, either because it
violates the Statute of Wills, is a "dummy" transaction, or fails
because of some other rule of general property law, it will, of

course, be set aside in toto.
Under the Newman v. Dore concept, however, where it is
recognized that a transfer may be valid as to all other persons,

but invalid, or "illusory," as to the surviving spouse, it would
seem to follow logically that such transfer should be set aside
"That an action may not be maintained when the decedent dies intestate,
see: Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 915 (1st
Dep't 1939), 40 COL. L. REv. 731, 53 HARv. L. REv. 691 (1940).
That it may, see: Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28
N.Y.S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941); Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.
2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), reo'g mem., 37 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd on
reargument, 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944), aff'd without
opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E. 2d 785 (1945); Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank,
86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Hirschfield v. Ralston, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 69 (Sup.
Ct. 1946). Also see Marano v. LoCarro, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946) aff'd
without opinion 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946) (impliedly
overruling Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, supra., on this issue.
Also see Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937), where
although the will gave the wife a sufficient share of her deceased husband's estate
to preclude her from renouncing it under New York law, the court set aside at
the wife's instance an inter vivos transfer which disposed of all of the decedent's
property.
"See 19 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 342, 362 (1942). After all, the concept that a
transfer may be set aside as invalid as to the survivor, though otherwise valid, in
itself goes beyond the election statutes, which, literally construed, are not concerned with inter vivos transfers.
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only pro tanto to the extent necessary to satisfy the share given
the survivor by the election statutes. And a number of cases have
so decided. 48 Similar holdings have been made in cases in which
the minority "intent to defraud" test has been applied,49 and also

in cases involving ante-nuptial transfers found to have been made
with the intent to defeat the expectant spouse's rights 0
II

Minority View

A minority of courts have held that a spouse's rights may not
be defeated by any transfer made during life with intent to deprive the spouse of property which, because of the election
statutes, would otherwise pass to such spouse. 51 A transfer made
with such intent is regarded as a fraud upon the other spouses
marital rights and will be set aside. Conversely, a transfer made
"See Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944);
Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947); President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Sup. St.
1939); Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Getz
v. Getz, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Pichurko v. Richardson, 107 N.Y.S.
2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re Freistadt's Will, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
aff'd without opinion, 278 App. Div. 962, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 995 (2d Dep't 1951),
motion for reargument granted, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't
1951). Also see Matter of Halpern, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 894 (1st
Dep't 1950) (modifying lower courts decree on this point), aff'd because beneficiary did not appeal, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951). However, in Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937) Aff'g, 250 App. Div. 708, 294
N.Y. Supp. 499 (1st Dept. 1937), and Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41
N.Y.S. 2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), reversing mem., 37 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (Sup. Ct.
1942), afFd on reargument, 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 538 (2d Dep't 1944),
atfd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E. 2d 785 (1945), the trusts were set
aside in toto.
"Payne v. Tatum 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930); Benge v. Barnett, 309
Ky. 354, 217 S.W. 2d 782 (1949); Wanstrath v. Kappell, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.
2d 327 (1947); Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945); Thayer v.
Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842).
'Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1st
Dep't 1935); Deke v. Huenhemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 102 N.E. 1059 (1913); Martin
v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. 2d 509 (1940). But see Vordick v. Kirsch,
216 S.W. 219 (Mo. 1919), where the transfer was set aside in toto.
'Payne v. Tatum, 236 Ky. 806, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930); Benge v. Barnett,
309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W. 2d 782 (1949); Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 AUt.
14 (1890) (Intent theory applied, but court also found that gift had not been
perfected.); Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352, 100 Ad. 671 (1917); Ibey v. Ibey,
93 N.H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842); Nichols
v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 Ad. 153 (1889). Also see cases collected in 64 A.L.R.
466 (1929); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); 157 A.L.R. 1184 (1945).
Missouri qualifies the rule by requiring that the transfer also have been made
in contemplation of death. Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895); Mertz v.
Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W. 2d 611 (1939) (Trust
also found to be testamentary); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W. 2d
327 (1947).
' See Note 5 supra.
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with an intent other than to cut off the transferor's spouse is valid,
since intent is the controlling factor. 3
While the test applied by the courts is the same, the protection afforded the survivor varies according to the rules and

presumptions which the courts have adopted to aid them in
administering the test. For example, in Vermont, the rule has
been adopted that:
S..* the law in no case presumes
seeks to set aside a conveyance on the
fraudulent must establish that fact so
clusively as to put it beyond a reasonable

fraud. One who
ground that it is
clearly 54and condoubt.

In New Hampshire, while fraud is also not presumed, the survivor is required only to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer was made with fraudulent intent.5 5 And
in Kentucky a survivor is aided by a presumption of fraud in instances in which the decedent transferred all or a greater portion
of his property during his lifetime."-

The courts in setting these transfers aside have not set them
aside in toto, but only pro tanto to the extent of the survivor's
statutory share.5 7 They have also set transfers aside in several
instances in which the transferors died intestate, although no case

has been found which expressly litigated this question. 58 As disI Cooke v. Fidelity Trust & S.V. Co., 104 Ky. 473, 47 S.W. 325 (1898); Dunnett v. Shields & Conant, 97 Vt. 419, 123 AtI. 626 (1924); Patch v.. Squires, 105
Vt. 405, 165 At]. 919 (1933).
" Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419, 123 Adt. 626 (1924). Also see Patch v.
Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 Adt. 919 (1933). Prior to the Dunnett case the Vermont
court had declared in Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 At. 153 (1889), that:
"The intent to defeat the marital rights of the oratri:x by both grantor and grantees
. . . is necessarily presumed from their knowledge that such rights would be
defeated by the conveyance. Both are presumed to have intended the natural results of their acts."
They v. Tbey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945). For the weird rule which
existed in New Hampshire prior to the Ibey ease, see Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352,
100 At. 671 (1917).
'Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890); Manikee v. Beard, 85
Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); Payne v. Tatum, 286 Ky. 806, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930).
This does not mean that a presumption may not arise to aid the challenging
spouse in any case in which less than the bulk of the other spouse s property was
transferred. See Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 854, 217 S.W. 2d 782 (1949).
" Payne v. Tatum, 286 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930); Benge v. Barnett, 309
Ky. 354, 217 S.W. 2d 782 (1949); Wanstrath v. Kappell, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.
2d 327 (1947); They v. bey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945); Thayer v.
Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842).
'See Payne v. Tatum, 236 Ky. 806, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930); Dyer v. Smith, 62
Mo. App. 606 (1895). Cf. Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842).
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cussed in connection with the test applied by the majority of
jurisdictions,"9 both of the above positions seem completely sound.
A fundamental objection to the intent to deprive, or fraud
test is that it fails to strike the balance between the spouse's
rights as appear to be required by the policy underlying the
election statutes. That policy would seem to recognize the right
of the one spouse to freely alienate his property during his lifetime. Yet at the same time, it would also appear to recognize the
right of the other spouse to be protected from disinheritance by
means of a device which will accomplish a result which the election statutes prevent the decedent from accomplishing by will.
The only type transfer which falls within this prohibition is one
in which the decedent retains for all practical purposes the ownership of the property until his death. It would not appear to
affect absolute transfers in which the spouse retained none of the
prerogatives of ownership, regardless of the motive or intent of
the transfer. The fraud test, however, denies free alienation in
this latter instance if the intent to deprive the other spouse of the
property is present. No protection, however, is afforded the survivor against a transfer in which the spouse retained most of the
prerogatives of ownership-although not enough to violate the
statute of wills, but made the transfer in good faith. Another
criticism of the fraud test is that doubt is cast upon all gratuitous
transfers made by a spouse during marriage.60
Conclusion
I. The minority intent to defraud test is unsatisfactory. It
not only makes every transfer potentially suspect, but protects
the surviving spouse only when fraud is involved. As a result, the
survivor is afforded no protection against transfers in which the
transferor retained most of the prerogatives of ownership but
made the transfer in good faith.
II. Also objectionable is the position taken by other courts
that any gratuitous inter vivos transfer is effective to cut off the

I See pages 626 et seq. supra.

'See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937). In Merz v.
Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 844 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W. 2d 611 (1939), the
court answered this criticism by stating that excessive litigation has not resulted
from the application of the test. Quaere: Does this fact make any or all transfers
less suspect?
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survivor as long as it does not violate the Statute of Wills or general property and trust law. This position ignores the fact that
the election statutes indicate a policy on the part of the legislature to protect a surviving spouse to a greater extent than an
heir or distributee.
III. The Newman v. Dore concept that a transfer although
valid as to all other persons may nevertheless be invalid as against
a surviving spouse is sound, for it recognizes the policy underlying the election statutes.
However, the courts should abandon the practice of refusing
to lay down precise rules in regard to the reserved powers sufficient to invalidate a transfer, for it has resulted only in uncertainty and confusion.
IV. It is submitted that the most satisfactory solution to this
problem lies in the adoption of a rule which declares invalid as
against a surviving spouse all gratuitous inter vivos transfers in
trust to the extent to which a deceased spouse retains either a
power of revocation, or amendment, or consumption of the principal of the trust, or any combination of these powers.
The rule should be applied whether the deceased spouse died
intestate or testate. The trust, if otherwise valid, however, should
not be set aside in toto, but only to the extent required to satisfy
the survivor's forced share.
This solution permits the one spouse to freely alienate his
property during his lifetime and at the same time protects the
survivor from disinheritance by means of a device which will accomplish a result which the election statutes prevent the decedent
from accomplishing by will.
If the courts are unwilling to afford adequate protection to
the survivor, it is believed that the problem is important enough
for this protection to be supplied by legislation."'
'This has been done in Pennsylvania. See
20 see. 301.11 (1950).
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